What is Prometheus Protocol?

Prometheus is a development-stage open protocol targeting decentralized AI-assisted threat intelligence on Kaspa. Current operation relies on owner-controlled policy and membership inputs; no production or fully decentralized protocol network is proven.

What is the PROM token?

PROM is a planned reward and governance token with no pre-mine, ICO, presale, founder or foundation allocation. Planned primary contribution issuance is distinct from later secondary trading. Minting, emission, liquidity and trading are not active.

How does Prometheus detect threats?

The target lifecycle uses local Phi-3 inference, approved proof-bound reporting, Guardian analysis, Commit-Reveal voting, Kaspa canonical rule state and IPFS content. Current Phi-3 is a bounded fail-closed safe-default stub with no loaded-model or quarantine authority; proof generation is also a development stub, Guardian rules are non-actionable or synthetic, and no production network operates.

When does Prometheus launch?

No fixed launch date is claimed. One non-promotable H-001 Testnet-10 canary is confirmed, but it cannot authorize Mainnet or full rollout. Six state deployments and production proof, privacy, model, multi-host, audit and release gates remain open.

Prometheus — Threat Intelligence Target Architecture

01 / Protocol

Target: on-chain in under 60 seconds.

The target path from anomaly to validated Kaspa rule after proof, observable, consensus, and rollout gates pass. Current verified ThreatHint v1 is deliberately non-actionable.

t=0s

T = 0 s

Light Client

Target: Phi-3-mini detects locally; artifact hash and privacy-filtered observable commitment are bound by an approved, precisely scoped proof.

ONNX Runtime
Groth16 ZK-proof
libp2p

t=2s

T = 2 s

Guardian Node

Target: 8B-first analysis with 70B escalation. Current evidence has no independently evaluated real-model run; YARA output is non-actionable or synthetic.

LLaMA 3 70B / 8B
vLLM · YARA
Min confidence 0.85

t=15s

T = 15 s

Validator Network

Tested state machines: Commit-Reveal, 10% bond, and 67% quorum. No operated validator network or decentralized membership is proven.

Silverscript
Commit-Reveal
Bond system

t=35s

T = 35 s

Kaspa Layer 1

Target: canonical rule state and CID on Kaspa, content on IPFS, with explicit rule deactivation. Asset orchestration, availability, replication, and censorship resistance remain open.

DAGKnight
KRC-20 (supply=1)
IPFS CIDv1

t=36s

T = 36 s

All Clients

Target: P2P distribution or Kaspa polling and verified local loading. GH-190 verifies bounded caller-supplied exact bytes against Raw-CIDv1. Merged and exact-main-verified GH-197/PR #198 checks one separately owner-pin-hashed Testnet-10 manifest against bounded RuleStorage UTXO observations before local state decoding. GH-203/PR #204 adds a bounded development-only query to one connected Testnet-10 node. GH-205 composes that path with a credential-free loopback-only local IPFS gateway, exact CID/content binding, and one atomic complete-snapshot scanner replacement. GH-207 adds owner-local restart-persistent rollback and same-order equivocation rejection with exact replay recovery. GH-209 adds bounded opt-in development orchestration with retry backoff, per-attempt timeout, shutdown cancellation, and single-flight execution. GH-211 authenticates one strict canonical complete-snapshot envelope with BIP340 against a separately owner-pinned key, external nonzero minimum sequence, and separately trusted per-fetch clock. Merged and exact-main-verified GH-213/PR #214 at bbe7efb adds an operator-invoked Development/Testnet-10 preflight/run CLI with private strict local files, offline non-mutating preflight, loopback-IP-literal RPC/IPFS, redacted status, and signal cancellation; CI 31950806131, Security 31950806118, and Pages 31950805653 pass. It adds no signer, key-authority/rotation proof, persistent sequence authority, autonomous provider, wallet or chain write and is not an independently authenticated canonical L1/IPFS source, availability or replication proof, chain-truth or finality proof, deployment, or public rule-distribution network.

Merged and exact-main-verified GH-216/PR #217 at 13c1812 adds test-only real-binary loopback E2E evidence for offline/connected preflight, private checkpoint commit, SIGTERM/SIGINT drain, restart exact replay, rollback/equivocation rejection, and malformed, timeout, or disconnected peers; CI 31978132036, Security 31978132044, and Pages 31978131647 pass. This is local Development evidence only, not public Testnet operation, independent RPC/IPFS truth or availability, deployment, Mainnet, or production readiness.

rusty-kaspa
libp2p broadcast
Local YARA engine

02 / Architecture

Three target layers.
Trust gates visible.

Target properties remain distinct from implemented fixtures, Testnet evidence, and production deployment.

1 Kaspa Layer 1

Canonical state target

DAGKnight consensus · 100 BPS
Silverscript smart contracts
Target PROM-RULES asset orchestration; current gate covers state/CID transitions
Native Groth16 ZK-verification
Sub-second finality
ValidatorStaking · RuleStorage

2 Optional services

Non-canonical views

Analytics and dashboards
Optional reward views
Planned secondary-market interfaces
Cannot override canonical L1 reputation
No Kasplex dependency for reputation
No service is production-deployed

0 Off-Chain · Device

Action layer

Target: Phi-3-mini local inference
Target: LLaMA 3 Guardian analysis
Target: Fed-DART federated learning
Local files and paths stay local; bounded metadata is explicit
P2P coordination via libp2p
Deterministic bounded automation; rollout gates remain explicit

GH-258/GH-261 is planned, not implemented: future endpoint detection includes unauthorized compute conscription of endpoints, accelerators, servers or data-center capacity into a distributed mesh. It would classify observable process/resource ownership, unexpected CPU/GPU workload, scheduler/orchestrator drift, workload-identity and outbound fan-out signals, not claim reliable AI/AGI attribution. The staged target is observe-only, warn-only, operator-confirmed reversible containment, then separately approved limited automation. No real-time endpoint sensor or response engine is implemented; quarantine, process termination, firewall mutation, credential rotation, remote commands, deletion, and host isolation are disabled and unauthorized.

GH-264 observe-only parser candidate: Rust and Python share one 512-byte-capped canonical statement with closed behavior domains/signals, bounded counts/windows, an opaque nonce, minute-granularity time and a separately trusted network. It reads no endpoint data, has no free-text or host-identifying fields, and proves no event truth, maliciousness, privacy, AI/actor attribution or authorization. No sensor, correlation, warning, transport, response authority or production behavior is added.

06 / Roadmap

Built in public.
Audited in public.

Sprints, findings, evidence, and remaining gates are tracked in the public repository.

Mar 2026

Sprint 0 — Setup & Testnet

Kaspa Testnet-10 node · repository structure · CI/CD pipeline

Accepted

Mar 2026

Sprint 1 — Silverscript Contracts

6 contracts · 54 tests · ValidatorStaking · GuardianReputation · RuleStorage

Accepted

Mar 2026

Sprint 2–3 — Rust Client & AI

Kaspa RPC · YARA scanner · Phi-3 wrapper · ZK-proof stub · Fed-DART

Accepted

Mar 2026

Sprint 4–5 — Guardian & Voting

vLLM Docker · YARA generator · Commit-Reveal · slashing engine

Accepted

Mar 2026

Sprint 6–7 — E2E & Documentation

Development-stub lifecycle fixture <60s · security tests · audit dashboard · whitepaper; not production evidence

Accepted foundation

Apr 2026 onward

Community workstream

Gitcoin Grants · public repository · external contributors; separate from accepted Sprint 8 Public Site delivery

In progress

Aug 2026

H-001 testnet-10 canary — 100% confirmed

external signature · full transaction verification · one-shot broadcast · confirmation · canonical operator receipt · independent public evidence · non-promotable canary only

Confirmed

Aug 2026

GH-167 bounded ThreatHint-v2 transport

exact Rust/Python frame · independent libp2p v2 channel · owner-only IPC · trusted session/time resolution · exact-main CI/Security/Pages verified · repository substrate only

Verified

Aug 2026

GH-170 bounded YARA-X validation

exact-pinned compile-only engine · one bounded rule · imports/includes and warnings rejected · no scan · exact-main CI/Security/Pages verified

Verified

Aug 2026

GH-173 deterministic semantic draft

approved v2 observables · memory-only candidate · nonce-bound binding/verdict persistence · exact-main CI/Security/Pages verified · no model, scan, submission, or production authority

Verified

Aug 2026

GH-177 synthetic YARA quality gate

20 deterministic in-memory cases · exact corpus/policy/evaluator binding · authority none · PR #178 merged at exact main 396d347 · CI, Security, and Pages pass

Verified

Aug 2026

GH-180 offline v2 pipeline integration gate

canonical synthetic transport to durable non-actionable result · replay, concurrency, lease, and rollback evidence · 1303 Guardian tests passed and 4 intentional live-model tests skipped · PR #181 merged at exact main a28ad00 · CI, Security, and Pages pass · not production-deployed

Verified

Aug 2026

GH-226 Light Client v1 submission

Development-only · one static literal-loopback Guardian QUIC peer · exact canonical bytes · owner-only files · real same-host binary evidence · PR #227 / exact main 6c39af5 · CI, Security Audit and Pages pass · no public multi-host or production operation

Verified

Aug 2026

GH-229 controlled distinct-host evidence

Merged capability PR #230 · exact main fba8bb4 · one operator-attested Development/Testnet-10 direct-QUIC run from source 27e8b02 on two distinct controlled hosts · rejected/rejected · zero retries · not persisted · temporary UDP rule removed · redacted evidence · no independent separation proof, public network or production claim

Demonstrated

Aug 2026

GH-234 ThreatHint-v2 submission

PR #235 · code b450740 · exact main f146fb2 · CI 33272578070 · Security 33272577951 · Pages 33272577407 · Development/Testnet-10 only · owner-only canonical shared v2 payload · separately trusted network parse before identity/network · exactly one Guardian v2 request · real same-host binary/QUIC tests · no proof or approval authority, public multi-host evidence, deployment or production claim

Merged

Aug 2026

GH-242 membership-bound ballots

Merged and exact-main verified via PR #243 at 5cb132c670d1e7771ccaf6dab2ddf5b1a6fd905a · CI 33433012614 · Security 33433012605 · Pages 33433011653 · owner-loads one canonical GH-147 membership source · separately trusted network and expected epoch · internally derived snapshot and public BIP340 signer map · no caller-built context registration · unchanged ballot wire, replay and ensemble math · no external membership authority, key rotation, Sybil, L1 attestation or production claim

Verified

Sep 2026

GH-246 membership continuity

PR #247 · exact main f12e821bb492caae3b94e5b3c882488eb7f2982d · CI 33452085421 · Security 33452085419 · Pages 33452084065 · canonical BIP340 signed transitions · owner-only durable current source, epoch, clock, replay and equivocation state · BallotIngress consumes current source under the same lock · 1348 Guardian tests pass, 4 intentional live-model skips · no external authority, key rotation, Sybil, L1, deployment or production claim

Verified

Sep 2026

GH-253 authority rotation

PR #254 · exact main 5920cb4bb737376977f762beb0d5e3108519c7a0 · CI 34031999904 · Security 34031999907 · Pages 34031999575 · owner-local dual BIP340 current-key authorization and proposed-key possession · gapless durable authority epochs · current membership/time/nonce binding · transactional schema-v1 migration · later transitions use only the current durable key · no signer/private-key path, real-world key ownership, external/decentralized authority, Sybil, L1, deployment or production trust

Verified

Readiness-gated

Complete roadmap vision — 50–55%

core rollout 84–88% · bounded v2 repository transport substrate · production proof approval · privacy-reviewed semantic analysis · operated multi-host P2P · clients · production network · vProgs

In progress

The security the world
never controlled.

Target: on-chain in under 60 seconds.

Three target layers.
Trust gates visible.

Four target roles.
Participation remains gated.

Two tokens.
No shortcuts.

Built in public.
Audited in public.

to humanity,
not to corporations.

The security the world never controlled.

Target: on-chain in under 60 seconds.

Three target layers.Trust gates visible.

Four target roles.Participation remains gated.

Two tokens.No shortcuts.

Built in public.Audited in public.

to humanity,not to corporations.

The security the world
never controlled.

Three target layers.
Trust gates visible.

Four target roles.
Participation remains gated.

Two tokens.
No shortcuts.

Built in public.
Audited in public.

to humanity,
not to corporations.